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The engagement of higher education in regional development in China 
 
Abstract  
The widely established role of higher education institutions (HEIs) in contributing to regional 
development is now also encouraged by the Chinese government. This development has been 
enabled by changes in state policy that in some respects align with global trends towards 
expansion, marketisation, and regional decentralisation in national higher education systems. 
However, the regional engagement of HEIs in China takes distinctive forms that are shaped 
by specific features of its governance system, including the politicisation of higher education, 
the incorporation of HEIs into the administrative hierarchy, and the disequilibrium of funding 
schemes between central and provincial owned HEIs. This paper provides a preliminary 
analysis of this relationship between higher education and regional development in China. It 
argues that the policy to encourage regional engagement by HEIs in China has generally 
served to enhance patterns of regional inequality between the coastal and inland regions and 
between upper and lower-administrative level cities.  
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1 Introduction 
The last three decades have seen the emergence of a globalised knowledge economy and fast 
economic growth in China which has, by contrast, been driven largely by labour-intensive 
manufacturing based industrialisation. While this may be described by the theory of global 
production networks (GPNs) as necessary for development from a transnational perspective 
(Coe et al., 2004; Ernst and Kim, 2002; Henderson et al., 2001), little attention has been paid 
to the significant increase of subnational regional disparity and inequality it may cause in 
peripheral regions at the low end of GPNs, especially in large countries such as China (Fujita 
and Hu, 2001; Zhang and Zhang, 2003). Indeed, regional disparity and inequality have 
become a major social, political, and economic concern in China in spite of the overall fast 
economic growth in the country (Fan, 1997; Fan and Sun, 2008; Lu et al., 2007; Shen, 2004). 
In order to tackle these issues, the Chinese government has made extensive efforts to 
encourage and support higher education to play a more important role both in industrial 
upgrading and regional development (MOE, 2006; MOE et al., 1992; MOST and MOE, 
2000). However, whether the policy is conducive to the overall objectives of rebalancing 
regional development or not is open for debate.           
On an international level, the notion that higher education institutions (HEIs) can be central 
agents in knowledge-based regional development has become widely recognised in both 
academic and policy discourse. A wide-ranging literature has developed that explores 
different facets of this relationship; including the ‘multiplier’ impacts of HEI employment 
and expenditure in the local economy, the migration patterns of graduates entering regional 
labour markets, the production of localised knowledge ‘spillovers’ through academic research, 
the effect on university-firm links of science and technology park developments, and the role 
of universities in regional innovation systems (for reviews see Goddard and Vallance, 2013; 
 
4 
Lawton Smith, 2007; Uyarra, 2010). This literature has also emphasised how these different 
forms of engagement are shaped by the wider institutional contexts in which the HEIs are 
based, which vary between countries and regions with different governance arrangements and 
socio-economic conditions. These contexts are configured through the complex interplay of 
policy drivers and barriers from the spheres of both higher education and regional economic 
development (OECD, 2007).  
This paper will aim to extend this predominately western-focused literature by exploring the 
different forms and effects of regional engagement by HEIs in China. Since the mid-twentieth 
century the Chinese higher education system has experienced a large expansion and 
undergone several significant restructurings to align with changes in national development 
policy, notable amongst which are nationalisation during the centrally planned economy, and 
marketisation and regionalisation in the post reform period. While the changes of the higher 
education system have been covered in previous work (e.g. Liu, 2007; Min, 2004; Mok, 2000; 
Mok and Wat, 1998; Williams et al., 1997), and a parallel literature exists on corresponding 
changes to regional policy in China (e.g. Fan, 1997; Li and Wu, 2012), the connections 
between these two processes have not been the main focus of previous studies. The paper will 
elucidate this relationship between higher education and regional development in China by, at 
the same time, considering it in light of the international literature on the subject, and 
situating it in the specific context of the Chinese economic and governance system.  
The paper has five further sections. Section 2 reviews the international literature on the role 
of the state in shaping the contribution of HEIs to regional development, structured around 
three common processes of change in national higher education systems: expansion, 
marketisation, and regional decentralisation. Section 3 briefly traces the historical 
development of Chinese higher education over the last six decades, concentrating on periods 
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of significant restructuring during the 1950s, the post-Mao economic reforms of the 1980s, 
and the subsequent move towards a more western-style partly decentralised and partly 
marketised system during the 1990s and 2000s. Section 4 discusses the political and 
administrative framework in which Chinese HEIs are positioned in more detail and how this 
shapes their relationship with governments at different levels. Section 5 builds on the analysis 
of the previous two sections to discuss the Chinese character of common forms of regional 
engagement by HEIs, including providing high-skilled workers to local labour markets, 
university enterprises and links with industry, and science park or campus development 
projects. Section 6 outlines the key conclusions from the paper. 
 
2 Higher education, the state, and regional development  
A strand of the considerable literature on the contributions that HEIs make to regional 
development has focused on exploring how these are shaped by state higher education and 
related economic development policies. This review section focus on three common forms of 
change in higher education systems internationally – national expansion, marketisation, and 
regional decentralisation – highlighting how they can feed into wider processes of (often 
uneven) regional development. This forms a background to the analysis of the Chinese case 
in the remainder of the paper.   
2.1 National Development 
The contribution of HEIs to regional development is framed in the first place by the national 
higher education policies of central governments. During the twentieth century universities 
increasingly became part of state-regulated national higher education systems (Delanty, 
2002). After the second world war, these systems underwent an international trend for 
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significant expansion towards ‘mass’ participation, driven in-part by national social and 
economic development concerns to extend higher education access to different segments of 
the population and increase human capital in labour markets (Schofer and Meyer, 2005). In 
many cases this expansion led to the higher education sector having a more comprehensive 
geographical coverage through the establishment of new universities or colleges in parts of 
the country previously without a HEI (Teixeira et al., 2014)1. However, the regional benefits 
arising from this expansion process may ultimately still have proved uneven: international 
evidence has indicated that in countries with open labour markets, a large proportion of 
students migrate to core regions upon graduation where prospective career opportunities are 
greater (Hoare and Corver, 2010; Kodrzycki, 2001; Venhorst, 2013). These migration 
patterns can particularly favour larger cities and serve to reproduce urban hierarchies 
(Benneworth and Herbst, 2015).  
During the same post-war period, the instrumental value of the research function performed 
by universities also came to be recognised in national economic development strategies. An 
initial focus on science and technology policies to increase national research and 
development capability has, in more advanced economies, shifted towards innovation policies 
that attempt to engender inter-relationships between the different types of public and private 
organisations that generate and apply knowledge in national systems (Lundvall and Borrás, 
2005). These national science and innovation policies can also have uneven regional effects, 
especially when increased investment in public scientific and R&D resources are 
concentrated in certain parts of the country. In some cases, where government innovation 
policy does not have a strong explicit regional dimension, this may be a by-product of 
pursuing overall national research excellence. For instance in the United Kingdom the policy 
of directing the majority of research funding into the highest performing institutions has 
continued to reproduce the favoured position of select leading universities located in London, 
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Oxford, and Cambridge in the greater south east of England (Goddard and Vallance, 2013). 
In other cases, however, this geographic concentration of public research and development 
capabilities may be part of a deliberate economic development strategy, especially in 
industrialising countries in which state-driven efforts to stimulate growth have been focused 
on certain regions or urban centres (Schiller, 2006; Sohn et al., 2009).  
This investment in academic research capability will have wider knock-on effects in the 
economy through mechanisms of knowledge spillover between universities and industry 
including collaborative research, spin-off firms, and movement of staff (Breschi and Lissoni, 
2001). The importance of spatial proximity in the networks that enable this knowledge 
spillover means that the resulting collective learning benefits are likely to be localised 
(Lawton Smith, 2007). In regions with strong entrepreneurship-supporting economies, this 
form of knowledge externality may help support the growth of clusters in science or 
technology-based industries (Patton and Kenney, 2010).  
2.2 Marketisation  
The expansion of higher education sectors discussed above has, due to the greater demands 
on public funding, often been accompanied by marketisation reforms. This is most often 
discussed in relation to a shifting from state grants to student tuition fees as the main means 
of funding teaching activity, but can also refer to connected or parallel changes increasing 
competition in, for example, systems for allocating research resources (Dill, 1997). 
Marketisation is also potentially related closely to trends for more provision of higher 
education by private institutions and/or funding of research from industry rather than 
government sources (Teixeira, 2014). These reforms have the effect of reinforcing 
hierarchical distinctions in national and global higher education sectors between research-
intensive universities with global standing and more teaching focused universities or colleges 
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(Marginson, 2006). In turn these different institutional types assume varying roles in regional 
development: leading universities may be less embedded in their regional economy than 
teaching-focused institutions with an orientation towards vocational training of local students, 
but do have the potential to generate wider innovation impacts through their research and 
commercialisation activities (Boucher et al., 2003; Huggins and Johnston, 2009). For 
research-intensive institutions in particular, the prioritisation of academic ‘excellence’ over 
social ‘accessibility’ can act as a barrier to regional engagement (see Tomaney and Wray, 
2011).    
As well as increased competition over scarce government resources for traditional academic 
functions, the pressure on public funding is widely believed to have contributed to 
universities throughout the world becoming more ‘entrepreneurial’ in seeking new revenue 
streams (Clark, 1998). Slaughter and Leslie (1997; 2001) argue that what they describe as an 
international trend towards ‘academic capitalism’ involves both market-like and market 
behaviours. Where market-like behaviours are focused on activities by institutions or faculty 
that involve “competition for funds from external resource providers” such as research 
councils or fee-paying students to undertake academic research or teaching, fully market 
behaviours “refer to for-profit activity on the part of institutions, activity such as patenting 
and subsequent royalty and licensing agreements, spin-off companies, arms-length 
corporations ... and university-industry partnerships when these have a profit component” 
(Slaughter and Leslie, 2001, p.154). As mentioned above, such directly entrepreneurial 
activity that involves industry links or the commercialisation of research has been emphasised 
in regional economic development discourse as a key mechanism of knowledge spillover that 
can feed into local innovation and cluster formation processes (Etzkowitz, 2012). Less 
discussed, but still notable in terms of its impact on urban and regional development, are 
entrepreneurial university activities in the sphere of property and real estate development, 
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that can include the construction of new university buildings or campuses, or involvement in 
projects like science parks (Goddard and Vallance, 2013; Perry and Wiewel, 2008; van 
Winden et al., 2012). In the introduction to an edited book of international case studies on 
this subject, Perry and Wiewel (2008) emphasise the role of state policy in mediating the land 
development activities of universities in cities by creating demand for new facilities through 
expansions in higher education sectors, as well as determining the funding and planning 
regulation frameworks in which development occurs.  
2.3. Regional decentralisation  
While in many countries higher education policy remains the preserve of central governments, 
reflecting the national development role discussed above, in other cases there is a significant 
level of regional decentralisation in the system. The clearest-cut examples of higher 
education being governed at a sub-national level are in large countries with federal systems of 
government such as the USA, Canada, and Germany. The higher education systems of these 
federal states vary considerably from country to country, but are all characterised by a 
complex multi-level system where different aspects of higher education are funded and 
regulated by federal and regional or provincial state governments (Cameron, 1992)2. The 
growth of political devolution movements over the past twenty years, driven by a 
combination of cultural, governance and economic factors (see Keating, 1997; Rodríguez-
Pose and Gill, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008), have created a dynamic towards 
regionalisation in other higher education systems. In European countries such as Belgium, the 
United Kingdom, and Spain in particular, higher education has been amongst the first areas of 
state powers decentralised to new or strengthened regional governments (Paterson, 2001).  
Regional or provincial state governance can lead to significant differentiation of higher 
education systems within a country. For instance, the USA has marked diversity in public 
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funding of universities between state governments (Trow, 1992). This varies the ability of 
universities to set tuition fees at levels that attract prospective students (from either inside or 
outside the state), which in turn subsequently impacts on graduate numbers in local labour 
markets (Cooke and Boyle, 2011; Groen and White, 2004). In the United Kingdom, the 
relatively short period since devolution in the late 1990s has seen considerable divergence of 
higher education policies (particularly relating to tuition fees) between the Westminster 
government (covering England) and devolved administrations in Wales, Northern Ireland and 
especially Scotland (Keating, 2005).  
In most countries, regardless of system of government, the funding of university research is 
controlled from the centre, in-part because this is an important instrument of national public 
policy in a number of areas (including economic development) (Cameron, 1992). In some 
unitary as well as federal states, however, the establishment of economic development and 
governance institutions at a regional level (Danson and Lloyd, 2012; Jones, 2001) has led to a 
degree of re-scaling of science and innovation polices from complete centralisation towards 
multi-level systems (Crespy et al., 2007; Goddard and Chatterton, 1999; Kitagawa, 2005). 
This may rarely extend to direct funding of core academic research by sub-national 
governments, but the incorporation of universities as central actors in sub-national economic 
development strategies has facilitated their integration into regional innovation systems. 
However, this extra institutional capacity is often constrained by the limited resources that 
regions are allocated by central governments and the extent to which the policy frameworks 
they operate in are defined at the national level (Perry and May, 2007). 
This section has outlined how common types of regional engagement by HEIs – including 
those related to training future graduate workers, supporting innovation through research 
commercialisation and industry links, developing science parks, and participating in building 
projects with urban development impacts – have been shaped by developments towards 
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expansion (including growing investment in research), marketisation, and regional 
decentralisation in national higher education systems. These general trends and their effects, 
which vary in form and degree from country to country, have been outlined by drawing on a 
literature that is predominately focused on Europe, North America, and Australia. The next 
section describes the evolving trajectory of higher education policy in China since the mid-
twentieth century, in order to begin to explore how comparable processes have unfolded in 
this specific non-western setting.   
 
3 Higher education policy in China  
The Chinese national higher education system underwent a number of radical transformations 
of model and administrative accountability as a consequence of changes of government in the 
first half of twentieth century and changes of policy in the second half (Cai, 2006). 
Throughout these frequent transformations, China’s higher education policy has been part of 
the core strategies of national development, but has only developed a regional development 
mission since the economic reform in the 1980s. This section will outline these changes.   
The main foundations of the contemporary Chinese higher education system were laid by the 
Kuomintang government in the first half of the twentieth century. When the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) came into power in 1949, the government followed the former 
Soviet model of higher education, prioritising the development of polytechnics whilst 
discouraging universities (Li et al., 2003). All HEIs were nationalised and then reconstituted 
into new universities, polytechnics, colleges, and vocational schools in 1952 (Min, 2004). 
The restructured HEIs were affiliated with the central government ministries of related 
industries and relocated to different cities throughout the country (Zhou, 2006). New 
polytechnics, colleges, and vocational schools were founded in the same way in the following 
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decades (Zhang, 2009). The research function was moved from HEIs to a separate national 
research system led by the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) and the Chinese Academy of 
Social Science (CASS), so that up until the 1990s, apart from a few universities, HEIs in 
China were teaching-only institutions (Liu, 2007). 
One of the most distinctive features of the higher education under the government of the CCP 
is that HEIs have been integrated into the communist political and administrative hierarchy 
(Yang, 2010), which itself is structured as (in descending order) national, 
ministerial/provincial, prefectural, county, and township levels of administration. Every 
public funded HEI has been assigned to a specific level of administration, which could be as 
high as equivalent to the vice-ministerial level or as low as the county level depending on 
their perceived importance (Figure 1). The higher the administrative level of a HEI the more 
power it has to make managing decisions and the more funding it receives from the 
government. For instance, the vice-ministerial level universities report directly to the State 
Council and enjoy vice-ministerial level autonomous power of administration, whereas 
prefectural and vice-prefectural level HEIs report to the responsible central ministries or 
provincial-level governments, and have less power of administrative autonomy (Wang, 2010). 
In the post-reform period, this classification is usually connected with the research capability 
of a given HEI.  
Insert Figure 1 here 
Such nationalisation and politicisation of HEIs paved the way for higher education to become 
oriented towards serving the needs of national development, with no regional dimensions 
taken into account (Chen and Wu, 2012; Cheng, 1998). All graduates were assigned to jobs at 
central government owned enterprises and/or research institutions, which themselves also did 
not have strong connections with the localities where they were located3 (Zhou, 2006). It was 
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only with the decentralisation policy announced in 1985 that genuine links between higher 
education and local and regional development became possible, even though the main aim of 
this decentralisation was to encourage local governments, individuals, and other non-state 
bodies, subject to the CCP’s policies, to become involved in the provision of higher education 
(Wei and Zhang, 1995). The decentralisation involved a number of related policies, notable 
amongst which were marketisation and regionalisation.  
The marketisation of higher education in China took two forms. The first was to allow private 
individuals and enterprises to establish HEIs in the form of self-sufficient enterprises, in 
response to the pressing demand for high-skilled workers from the booming private sector 
(MOE, 1993a). Privately funded and managed HEIs have subsequently emerged and quickly 
grown to become an indispensable provider of higher education in China. The number of 
privately funded HEIs had reached 1007 in 2011 with 7.73 million students (MOE, 2012) 
although they remain teaching-only institutions targeted at local labour markets. The second 
was the introduction of a type of what Slaughter and Leslie (1997; 2001) call academic 
capitalism, in which public HEIs are encouraged to recruit extra self-funded students on top 
of the national quotas, acquire non-state funding resources, and run arms-length enterprises 
and university-industrial joint ventures. This, together with the introduction of a “fees paying” 
policy in 1995/96 (Mok, 2000), had by 2009 led to public funding dropping to less than 40% 
of total higher education income nationally and to below 20% in some poor provinces (Shao 
and Wang, 2010).  
Regionalisation 4 involved the transfer of HEIs affiliated with the central ministries to 
provincial governments and the encouragement of local governments to establish locally-
owned HEIs (Cheng, 1998). However, in contrast to the equivalent regional decentralisation 
process in most Western contexts, policy making is exclusively controlled by the Chinese 
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central government leaving provincial governments only to bear the cost. From 1994 to 2007, 
293 HEIs were transferred to provincial governments in this way (NBSC, 2008). By 2011, 
the number of fully provincial funded HEIs reached 1602, whilst the number of central 
government funded HEIs dropped to 111 (NBSC, 2012). Regionalisation has led to provincial 
governments becoming the predominant provider of higher education. Nevertheless, in the 
context of significant regional disparities between core cities and provinces in the coastal 
region and their counterparts in inland regions, regionalisation has resulted in a marked 
divergence in higher education funding between the rich and poor provinces. Ding and Hu 
(2012) and Shao and Wang (2010) estimate that funding (per student) received by HEIs in the 
core cities could be 7 times higher than that in poor provinces.  
These decentralisation reforms have effectively mitigated the central government’s “financial 
burden” in funding the rapid expansion of higher education (Mok, 2000) and allowed it to 
concentrate on funding nationally-leading universities that are capable of research excellence. 
The research function in universities was once again encouraged, with the Ministry of 
Education successively launching the so-called “211 Programme” to support 100 universities 
to become research-intensive universities at the turn of the 21st century (MOE, 1993b) and 
the “985 Programme” to help nationally-leading universities develop toward becoming 
“world class” universities (Liu, 2007; Ma, 2004). Substantial extra funds were made 
exclusively available to the universities that qualified as part of these schemes. In order to 
meet the relevant criteria, some existing universities, polytechnics, and/or colleges were 
merged to become comprehensive universities (MOE, 1993b). Provincial governments were 
also asked to support the universities located in their region to bid for these designations 
(Ding, 2007). From 1993 to 2001, 708 HEIs had merged to become 302 universities, although 
the majority of the qualified universities were owned by the central government (MOE, 2009).  
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Despite the relocation of some institutions in the centrally-planned economic period, HEIs 
are still unevenly distributed throughout China. This is particularly the case with the central 
government owned universities that are strongly committed to research. Table 1 lists the 
number of HEIs by province and accountability. While the eastern region has more HEIs in 
general, central government-owned universities are concentrated in a few core cities. Of the 
110 central government-owned universities, 69 are located in the eastern region. More 
specifically, 46 out of the 112 “211 Universities” and 15 of the 39 “985 Universities” are 
concentrated in just Beijing, Shanghai, and Jiangsu provinces (MOE, 2012). In the context of 
inequalities in the system of higher education funding, the concentration of central 
government-owned universities means that the more developed regions receive a greater 
share of financial support from the central government than poorer regions, even before the 
extra funding support for the “211” and “985” universities, which further enhances this trend, 
is taken into account.  
Insert table 1 here 
Although the Ministry of Education has designated a dozen “211 Universities” in the central 
and western regions in the last few years in response to this geographic imbalance, the level 
of funding support from the central government was much less than for universities 
designated in the first cohort. Moreover, because none of these universities belong to the 
central government, the responsible provincial governments were asked to provide match 
funding to the designated universities creating an added financial burden to these local 
governments.       
In summary, this section has described changes in higher education policy in China that have 
allowed the system to evolve from one entirely focused on national development objectives 
to one in which, through decentralisation reforms, more direct links to local and regional 
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development are also possible. These changes have involved elements of the expansion, 
marketisation, and regional decentralisation dynamics in national higher education systems 
that the preceding section identified as being important in encouraging and shaping the 
regional engagement effects of HEIs internationally. In China, however, HEIs remain 
positioned in the national political and administrative hierarchy that also fundamentally 
shapes their institutional characteristics, geographical location, and regional development 
impacts. The next section discusses the implications of this particular governance system in 
more detail.     
 
4 The politics of HEIs engaging in local and regional development 
The strong hierarchical administration and politicisation of both local and regional 
governance and HEIs complicate the relations between higher education and regional 
development in China in two major respects. First, there are five levels of government in 
China, each of which has its own relatively independent public finance (Dunford, 2011), 
which makes central-local relationships considerably more complex than in most equivalent 
western multi-level governance settings. Under the economic-centred development strategy, 
the prioritised functional responsibility of every unit of governments is to promote the 
economic growth of the place under its jurisdiction. Competition for resources therefore 
occurs not only between governments at the same level, but also between those at upper and 
lower levels (Man, 2011; Martinez-Vazquez and Qiao, 2011).  
Second, because all public funded HEIs, state owned enterprises, non-government 
organisations, and even large private owned enterprises, are politicised and incorporated into 
the administrative hierarchy, the relations between HEIs and local and regional development 
depend greatly on the administrative levels5 in question. On the one hand, both the centrally 
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owned and provincially owned HEIs have to fulfil the tasks mandated respectively by the 
central government and affiliated provincial governments, which means they must provide 
consultancy or other support to localities and regions for free. For example, HEIs are asked 
by their affiliated governments to send academic and administrative staff to prefectural or 
county level-governments to take secondment posts. On the other hand, unless attractive 
funding is offered, HEIs with higher level of administration will not voluntarily discuss 
official collaborations with local governments with a lower level of administration.  
Nevertheless, spatial proximity often means that, despite these disparities in administrative 
level, close relationships are built between HEIs and the places where they are located. This 
has become more evident under the policy that local governments are asked to co-fund the 
universities located in their places but owned by the central government. In many cases, local 
political and government leaders take chair positions on various academic and non-academic 
boards in the universities. For example, the Secretary General of CCP at Chongqing has 
assumed the position of honorary chair on Chongqing University Board, a steering committee 
aiming to direct the development and fundraising policy, while a Deputy Mayor of the 
municipal government fulfils the role of chair (Li and Zhao, 2009). Similar arrangements are 
common in other parts of the country (e.g. Dai, 2009). Such forms of relationship facilitate 
the engagement of HEIs into the localities on the one hand and help the HEIs’ fundraising on 
the other.  
Central government owned HEIs can also establish collaborative relationships with other 
provinces or cities outside their localities providing that they can offer attractive funding in 
return. Tsinghua University, for instance, signed collaborative contracts with 8 provincial-
level governments and 40 vice-provincial and prefectural level governments via their 
provincial governments, to jointly develop new campuses, science parks, and/or research 
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institutes (Liu and Jiang, 2001). However, these activities are primarily motivated by profit-
seeking, in line with the move towards ‘academic capitalism’ noted above, and have involved 
intensive commercial-like negotiations between the university and local governments. In 
comparison to the engagement with the places where the HEIs are located, the collaborations 
with other places have generally been less productive (Wang, 2009). 
At the local level, the collaborations between provincial-owned HEIs and prefectural-level 
governments resemble the pattern of the central-owned HEIs with provincial-level 
governments. Given the relative concentration of HEIs and other elements of production in 
the capital cities of provinces, the provincial capitals (who all enjoy prefectural or vice-
provincial levels of administration) have advantages over other prefectural-level cities. 
Moreover, the establishment of official relationships between HEIs (either central-owned or 
provincial-owned) and county-level governments is unlikely because of their incomparable 
powers of administration.  
 
5 Forms of engagement  
This section will build on the analysis thus far by outlining some of the specific forms that 
regional engagement by HEIs in China takes. It will cover five types of engagement that are, 
in some broad comparable form, also present in many of the western countries covered in the 
academic literature: providing high-skilled workers to local labour markets, directly running 
business firms and enterprises, forming linkages with industry, collaborating in the 
establishment of science parks, and developing higher education campuses parks. These 
forms of engagement will be discussed in turn, with particular focus on the ways in which 
they are shaped by the higher education system reforms and governance framework described 
over the previous two sections, and on the regional development effects they have in relation 
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to existing patterns of inequality between coastal and inland regions and between upper and 
lower-administrative level cities. 
5.1 Supplying high-skilled workers to labour markets 
As mentioned earlier, the entry of HEI graduates into local or regional labour markets took 
place only after the decentralisation of higher education in conjunction with the market-
oriented economic reform. Instead of being allocated to jobs under the centrally-planned 
economy, higher education graduates were told to find employment opportunities from local, 
regional, and cross-regional labour markets (Williams et al., 1997). In the first few years this 
policy was welcomed by the non-state sectors because it meant that, for the first time, they 
could directly recruit the higher education graduates they needed. However, given that the 
Chinese economy is predominately driven by labour-intensive manufacturing and 
construction industries, the demand for highly educated workers has not kept up with the 
increase in graduates. The swift expansion of higher education has therefore resulted in 
graduates facing difficulties in finding suitable employment. As shown in Figure 2, the 
number of graduates remained fairly stable before 1999, but significant increases every year 
since 2003 has changed the landscape of the graduate labour market. When the first enlarged 
class of graduates entered the labour market in 2003, half of them could not find employment 
in the year, which represented a roughly equal proportion to that of the increased admission 
in 1999 (Chen, 2004), and in 2009 alone, about 2.0 million out of 6.11 million graduates 
remained unemployed (MOE, 2009). The high ratio of unemployment amongst higher 
education graduates has emerged as a major social concern, prompting the central 
government to force local authorities to generate more employment opportunities (People 
Daily, 2009). In such a context, local governments may come to see graduates more as a 
potential liability than as a future resource. 
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Insert Figure 2 here 
The unavailability of reliable nation-wide data means that a meaningful statistical analysis of 
inter-regional graduate flows is not possible. However, the large regional disparities in China 
means that there is an observable pattern that the relatively well-developed coastal regions 
can provide better opportunities and well-paid jobs for higher education graduates, not only 
from within those regions but also from the inland regions. This means that, while there will 
have been some concentration of graduates in the upper administrative level of cities, high 
quality graduates tend to be pulled into the cities in the coastal regions, in particular Beijing 
and Shanghai (Bai, 2006). The patterns of these main graduate flows from HEIs into 
employment are represented in the schematic diagram shown in figure 3. In the context of the 
decentralisation of responsibility for higher education funding, this employment trend will 
arguably create a drain of talent as well as financial resources from lower level cities and/or 
inland lagging regions to the upper levels or core cities in coastal regions, which will 
inevitably further intensify regional inequality.   
Insert Figure 3 here 
The central government’s policy aimed at promoting employment has had only moderate 
success. As one of the solutions to the high unemployment rate, the central government 
launched a scheme of recruiting more graduates as civil servants in 2006, which immediately 
made this the most competitive job opportunity amongst graduates in the country. Wang 
(2012) documents that, in 2011, there were 1.03 million graduates (out of a total of 6.08 
million) competing for 16,000 office jobs at the central government. The ratio of candidates 
to jobs for some key posts has exceeded 3000 to 1. This is also the case at provincial, 
prefectural, and county levels of government, particularly in lagging regions. With the 
household registration system (Hukou) still in effect, graduates who are unable to find jobs in 
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cities where they studied in the year of graduation will have to move their Hukou back to 
their original places of registration. Given the lack of vibrant industries in the lagging 
localities and regions, the central government’s policy that requires local governments to find 
employment for graduates has led to local governments recruiting more civil servants above 
the given quota. Considering the limited capacity of public finance in the lagging regions, the 
expansion of the government body will consume more public spending and, in turn, reduce 
investments in social and economic development. 
Graduate entrepreneurship has also been promoted in the last few years, but with results that 
vary across localities and regions (Chen et al., 2010). The scheme asks local governments to 
support start-up firms established by graduates. In practice, this is often delivered through 
“start-up incubators” in conjunction with the development of the science or high and new 
technology industrial parks that will be discussed below. Nevertheless, this has once again 
fallen into the pattern associated with the regional disparities. In most cases, those graduates 
who return to their hometowns in poor regions simply do not have the required 
entrepreneurial ambitions or skills, and also face an unfavourable business environment for 
start-ups. Meanwhile, local governments also cannot compete with their counterparts in the 
rich localities and regions to offer attractive “start-up funds” (Jiang and Xu, 2012). The 
combination of these disadvantages means that poor localities and regions have faced greater 
barriers to benefiting from the increase in higher education graduates nationally.  
5.2 Running arms-length business firms and enterprises  
In the early stages of marketisation in China, most HEIs restricted themselves to running 
commissioned courses, offering adult education and evening courses. Some went beyond this 
by taking advantage of their higher education brand to open business firms and enterprises, 
joining in the nationwide proliferation of commercial activities (Mok and Wat, 1998). This 
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was evidently successful in the short-term, and led to the flourishing of HEIs owned 
enterprises throughout China (Yang and Xu, 2004). By 1997, their number had reached its 
peak at 6634, generating RMB 29.6 billion sales income and RMB 2.72 billion profits (MOE, 
1998). Most of these enterprises were involved in labour-intensive service activities, such as 
renting out their premises, running cafeterias or bars and off-campus hotels, and even turning 
their assembly halls into entertainment venues (Kwong, 1996). However, many of them 
failed to survive, leaving a great deal of debt and other problems to their parent HEIs (MOE, 
2005).  
Nevertheless, some exceptions exist, such as Tsinghua, Peking, and few other national 
renowned universities, which attempted to connect their research strengths with commercial 
business activities (Liu and Jiang, 2001). The relative success of these spin-off enterprises, 
together with the influence exerted by celebrated examples from Silicon Valley and 
elsewhere in the developed world, induced the government to establish a national scheme – 
Integrating Teaching/Learning and Research with Production (ITLRP) – that encouraged 
HEIs to start businesses based on their knowledge and technology strengths (MOE et al., 
1992). By 2010, more than 2200 HEI-run enterprises (60% of the total) were high or new 
technology based businesses, generating over 80% of annual total sales income (Jiang, 2012). 
Some of these companies have been listed both in domestic and international stock markets.  
From a local and regional development perspective, however, this policy has been highly 
controversial. As noted by Wu G (2007), more than half of the total sales income was 
contributed by a small number of enterprises affiliated with a few top universities in Beijing, 
coinciding once again with the concentration of research universities and regional disparities. 
Given the policy of directing the majority of research funding into selected leading 
universities, the concentration of such universities in Beijing, Shanghai, and a few other 
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provincial and vice-provincial level cities means that the benefits of knowledge spillovers 
from this mechanism of spin-out firms are mainly gained by these localities. The typically 
weaker research capability of HEIs located in lagging localities and regions, by contrast, 
means that they are unlikely to generate new technologies that could be used for immediate 
production, and their involvement in entrepreneurial activities has therefore rarely been 
linked to their research. Zhang (2003) and Yang and Xu (2004) also note that the policy of 
encouraging HEIs to be involved in entrepreneurial activities has risked the limited education 
funding of public funded HEIs in many inland regions by diverting resources into this 
entrepreneurial activity. Wu G (2007) observes that even in the core cities, the returns from 
many HEI-run enterprises have been relatively modest when compared with the investment 
needed.  
5.3 Linkages with industry 
The engagement of HEIs with industry involves both individual academic staff and 
institutional activities (Dai, 2009). Individuals may carry out commissioned research and 
consultancy, take secondary jobs in businesses relating to their expertise, work for enterprises 
whilst keeping only a nominal position in a HEI with no more responsibilities for teaching 
and research, or leave the HEI completely to work for enterprises or set up spin-off 
businesses (MOE et al., 1992). The enthusiasm with which this policy was met meant that a 
large number of academic staff engaged with industry whilst neglecting teaching and research 
(Wei, 1996). As a consequence, the engagement of individual academics with industry, whilst 
not banned, has subsequently been discouraged.  
The institutional efforts of HEIs developing linkages with industry (other than directly 
running business firms and enterprises themselves) have by contrast received constant 
encouragement since its introduction. The collaboration, similar to in other countries, usually 
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takes the form of knowledge and technology transfer through licensing and other 
arrangements such as consulting, joint or contract R&D and technical services, and joint 
ventures (Wu W, 2007). Nonetheless, HEIs adopt different strategies and attitudes to 
collaborate with different sized enterprises. Both central-owned and provincial-owned HEIs 
are keen to enter joint ventures with large companies, especially state-owned ones, to invest 
in and run laboratories and R&D centres, tailor-made training courses, and post-doctoral 
centres. In return, HEIs hope to create liaison networks with these large enterprises, enabling 
the effective circulation of R&D data and feedback of information on current demand levels 
from member enterprises. Given that the Chinese economy is dominated by labour-intensive 
manufacturing industry, the enthusiasm of the HEIs for these joint ventures has not been 
matched by demand from the enterprises. As a consequence, only a relatively few leading 
universities have the opportunity to pursue this form of engagement.   
In contrast, public HEIs (particularly those that are central-owned) are usually unwilling to 
directly engage with small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) apart from in fulfilling the 
tasks mandated respectively by central and provincial governments (Wang, 2009). HEIs 
therefore are requested to work with the Productivity Promotion Centres (PPC), a 
government’s arms-length agency responsible for promoting science and technology and 
innovation, to exchange information between HEIs and SMEs (MOST, 1997; Wu G, 2007). 
Regardless of whether there is a match between the demand and supply, this pattern of 
collaboration will only work if the governments have enough authority to give orders to the 
HEIs. Given that the HEIs with research capabilities normally have prefectural-level power 
of administration or above, this has developed into a situation where prefectural and county 
levels of government, which are directly responsible for their local SMEs, have no authority 
to ask such HEIs to cooperate with the PPCs in their area. Once again, only those SMEs 
located in the vice-provincial or provincial-level cities may have benefited from this policy. 
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On the other hand, even when HEIs are willing to provide such consultancy services directly 
to local SMEs, in most cases the cost is unaffordable to many SMEs.   
5.4 Science Parks 
Drawing on success stories from both international and national practice, such as Stanford 
University Science Park, Cambridge Science Park, and Zhongguancun High Technology Park, 
in 2000 the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Education (MOST and 
MOE, 2000) jointly announced a national programme – National University Science Park 
(NUSP) – encouraging HEIs specialising in science, technology, and engineering disciplines 
to establish science parks. As part of this programme, policy incentives such as tax breaks, 
low interest loans, and free use of land are made available both by central and provincial 
levels of government (MOST, 2000). A science park that meets a set of criteria will qualify 
for NUSP6 status and therefore enjoy more support from the central government (MOST and 
MOE, 2004). In practice, given the public finance arrangements in China, both HEIs and 
local governments see the NUSP programme as an opportunity for commercial benefits, and 
therefore, competition between places to have a NUSP is high. By 2012, 98 science parks, 
with the involvement of 134 HEIs, had qualified as NUSP, of which 14 are located in Beijing 
and 13 in Shanghai (MOST and MOE, 2013).  
Detailed information on the performance of the NUSPs is not available and there is no 
academic study attempting to evaluate the programme as a whole, but a news report by Zhao 
(2009) notes that with the exception of a few that involve national leading research 
universities, most NUSPs have faced problems either in terms of lacking research strengths in 
technology and engineering or encountering operational difficulties7. Given the geographic 
concentration of universities with research capabilities, a few core cities have again 
particularly benefited from this programme. In many other cases, the programme has been 
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treated as a political assignment and an opportunity to compulsorily convert more agricultural 
land to urban development use from which profits may be made due to the increased land 
value (Wang, 2009).      
5.5 Higher education campus parks  
The development of higher education campus parks (HECP), also commonly referred to as 
“university towns” in China, was initially a reactive response to the radical expansion of 
higher education admission beginning in 1999 (Dong, 2005). In order to accommodate the 
significantly increased number of students, HEIs were prompted to expand their campuses or 
build entirely new campuses using bank loans at subsidised interest rates. The potential 
contributions of these projects to urban development processes were however also soon 
recognised. In order to maximise these economic benefits, several HEIs were often directed 
to co-locate in one designated area which is usually in suburban areas that were relatively 
detached from the city core (Shu, 2003). There are more than 50 designated HECPs, with 
land areas ranging from 20 to 70 km² (Wei, 2006). Some large HECPs are able to 
accommodate over 600,000 students, and the land area for each campus is normally over five 
times larger than the old ones (Shu, 2003). 
As with the building of new higher education campuses or buildings internationally (Perry 
and Wiewel, 2008), the development of HECPs in China may have positive impacts on local 
economic growth, but also potential drawbacks. They have been criticised for having been 
“only meaningful for local GDP growth in the short run” (Chen and Zhang, 2004), while 
encumbering HEIs with debts of at least RMB 450 billion by 2011 (Cao, 2012). In some 
lagging regions, the huge debts have left HEIs struggling to survive. As a result many HEIs 
unlawfully charge students with extra fees on the top of tuition fees, while others venture into 
the real estate development business by taking advantage of the low priced land they acquired 
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for campuses (Wei, 2006). This has not only caused tensions between students and the HEIs, 
but also potentially put the public finances of the responsible local governments, particularly 
those in lagging regions, at risk (Liu, 2012).     
 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has presented a preliminary analysis of the different forms and effects of regional 
engagement by HEIs in China. The intention has not been to cover these different forms of 
engagement in a highly detailed or comprehensive way8, but to outline a broad framework of 
understanding that can help guide future research. In particular, we have aimed to highlight 
connections and parallels with the international literature on higher education and regional 
engagement, whilst also reflecting the specificity of the institutional context for this 
relationship in China.  
The paper has described the historical trajectory through which decentralisation policies since 
the mid 1980s have enabled the Chinese higher education system to evolve from being 
entirely focused on national development objectives to also encouraging direct links with 
local and regional development. These reforms can be interpreted as sharing some elements 
in common with global trends towards expansion, marketisation, and regional 
decentralisation in higher education systems that, as the western-focused literature reviewed 
earlier explains, has facilitated and shaped the often uneven regional development impacts of 
HEIs in other national settings. The paper has, however, also emphasised that different forms 
of regional engagement and their territorial development effects in China, including those 
related to the entry of graduates into labour markets, university enterprises and links with 
industry, and science park or campus development projects, take distinctive forms that stem 
in part from the particular governance system in which HEIs are based.  
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The paper has also related these forms of regional HEI engagement to patterns of uneven 
territorial development in China. Specifically, we have shown that cities enjoying higher 
levels of administration in general, and core cities with concentrations of national leading 
universities owned by the central government in particular, have been the major beneficiaries 
of the national policy encouraging HEIs to engage in local and regional development. A 
conclusion therefore can be drawn that this policy has generally served to enhance patterns of 
regional inequality between the coastal and inland regions and between upper and lower-
administrative level cities. This is argued to be a product of certain structural and institutional 
factors, such as the politicisation of higher education, the incorporation of HEIs into the 
administrative hierarchy, and the disequilibrium of funding schemes between central and 
provincial owned HEIs. If higher education is to be utilised to help reduce regional disparities 
in China, therefore, this suggests that HEIs will have to be de-coupled from the political and 
administrative hierarchy, as well as appropriate reforms of the funding schemes carried out to 
help HEIs in lagging localities and regions that are developing towards becoming more 
research-intensive universities. Such reforms will need to be coordinated with measures to 
help retain and attract high quality graduates to lagging localities and regions through 
fostering vibrant industries driven by knowledge or technology innovation and reducing 
dependency on employment in the public sector.    
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Figure 1. Accountability and administrative hierarchy of China’s HEI 
Source: Author’s research  
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Table 1. Number of HEIs by province and accountability  
 
HEIs in 
total  Universities  Colleges  
Central 
Owned 
211 
Universities  
985 
Universities  
National total  2138 841 1297 110 112 39 
 Beijing 83 57 26 34 26 9 
 Shanghai 63 31 32 10 9 4 
 Jiangsu 128 46 82 10 11 2 
 Hebei 95 37 58 4 1 0 
 Tianjin 45 19 26 3 3 2 
 Guangdong 120 40 80 3 4 2 
 Shandong 124 49 75 2 3 2 
 Fujian 77 23 54 2 2 1 
 Zhejiang 80 33 47 1 1 1 
 Hainan 17 6 11 0 1 0 
East subtotal 832 341 491 69 61 23 
Shannxi 79 42 37 6 7 3 
 Sichuan 86 34 52 6 5 2 
 Gansu 37 15 22 2 1 1 
 Chongqing 53 17 36 2 2 1 
 Ningxia 14 6 8 1 1 0 
 Tibet 6 3 3 0 1 0 
 Qinghai 8 3 5 0 1 0 
 Inner Mongolia 46 13 33 0 1 0 
 Xinjiang 34 13 21 0 2 0 
 Yunnan 59 22 37 0 1 0 
Guizhou 41 17 24 0 1 0 
 Guangxi  61 22 39 0 1 0 
West subtotal 520 207 313 17 24 7 
 Hubei 96 40 56 8 7 2 
 Hunan 106 31 75 3 3 2 
 Anhui 107 33 74 2 3 1 
 Henan 112 39 73 1 1 0 
 Shanxi 67 19 48 0 1 0 
 Jiangxi 75 24 51 0 1 0 
Centre subtotal  563 186 377 14 16 5 
 Liaoning 94 45 49 5 4 2 
 Heilongjiang 77 34 43 3 4 1 
 Jilin 48 28 20 2 3 1 
Northeast subtotal  219 107 112 10 11 4 
 Source: Adapted from MOE (2012) 
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Figure 2. Number of graduates (1995-2011) 
Source: NBSC, 2012 
  
 
32 
 
 
Figure 3. The illustration of flows of graduates for employment 
Source: Authors’ research.  
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1 For instance, this founding of new universities in peripheral regions has been used as an 
explicit regional policy tool in countries including Sweden, Greece, and Finland (Andersson 
et al. 2004; Labrianidis, 2010; Saarivirta, 2010). 
2 These arrangements are also subject to change over time: for instance in Australia during 
the 1970s the federal government assumed full control for the funding of higher education 
(and therefore also greater control over planning and coordination of the sector) due to its 
stronger financial position relative to the state governments (Smith and Wood, 1992; 
Tomaney and Wray, 2011). 
3  Under the centrally-planned economy, central government owned enterprises/research 
institutions were part of central ministries. They were not allowed to recruit staff locally, who 
were instead allocated by the responsible central ministry. The profits made by the enterprises 
were taken directly by the central government. The only link between them and the localities 
was food supply which put a heavy burden on local governments in the time when there was 
a general food shortage. Local governments therefore tended to oppose the location of HEIs 
and central government owned enterprises/research institutions in their places.    
4 There is a terminology issue here. Given the multilevel government system in China, the 
term “region” may indicate different spatial scales in different contexts. In the Chinese 
convention, the lower levels of administrative territories are usually referred to as “local” by 
the upper levels. Hence, this process is more likely to be referred to as ‘localisation’ in 
Chinese, but this decentralisation of HEIs to provincial level governments is actually closer in 
western terms to a policy of regionalisation.    
5 The transfer of ownership of HEIs to provincial level governments did not change the 
political and administrative levels of the HEIs that had been designated.    
6 A typical NUSP usually occupies at least 150 ha of land (usually located within the High 
and New Technology Industrial Zones), and is comprised of a number of business incubators 
– including graduate start-up incubators, foreign-educated returnees start-up incubators, and 
university spin-off incubators; R&D facilities – including open laboratories; factories; and 
service facilities – such as venture capital and investment, marketing and management 
consultancies, and property management (MOST and MOE, 2006). In 2012 there were 6617 
start-ups currently in the incubators, and more than 4300 firms previously based in the 
incubators that had moved out (MOST, 2012). 
7 This picture is supported by a case study conducted in Lanzhou (Ren et al., 2007). 
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8 Indeed, other notable forms of engagement have emerged more recently, such as sending 
academic and administrative staff to peripheral local governments to help policy-making and 
recruiting higher education graduates to work as assistant head of village communities, which 
have not been discussed in this paper due to the limited data on them that is currently 
available.  
